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ABSTRACT 
 
The association  between government debt and economic growth is complex. Namibia is not 
excluded from this spectacle as concerns are mounting about the fast-increasing state debt 
and its implication on economic growth in the long run. By the end of 2016, government 
debt constituted 40.6 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Domestic and external debt 
constituted 25.3 and 15.3 percent of GDP respectively. Total interest paid on state debt stood 
at about 1 percent of GDP. Various financial debates stress that the debt incurred to enhance 
economic growth via investment should also consider interest payment costs. Counter-
arguments emphasise that if governments borrow to stimulate growth via increased economic 
earnings, then state debt growth might not pose a problem to the economy.  
 
This study examined the relationship between economic growth and government debt 
components for Namibia over the sample period 2000-2016. The study employed a time series 
econometric model method to examine the nature of the relationship that exists between 
government debt indicators and economic growth. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) was 
employed in testing the unit root characteristics of the series and to determine the order of 
integration. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration framework was also 
employed to determine whether there is a long run and short-run relationship between the 
variables. Finally, the Granger Causality Test was conducted to test causation between the 
variables. To investigate these issues, quarterly time series data for the period 2000-2016 was 
used.  
 
The results of cointegration analysis supports the existence of a positive long run cointegration 
relationship between government debt indicators and economic growth to indicate that debt 
drives economic growth in Namibia. The study found no causality effect between general debt, 
foreign debt, domestic debt and GDP.  The main policy recommendation from this study is 
that, in order to avoid the country from plunging into a debt crisis, the Namibian government 
should consider determining an optimal debt-to-GDP ratio to serve as an indicator beyond 
which an increase in debt will be deemed unsustainable. The government should further 
ensure that the debt Fund is used for production and infrastructure development instead of 
consumption spending to stimulate the productive capacity of the economy.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Context of the Study 
The 2012 Greek debt exchange was a landmark event in the Euro debt crisis. It generated 
fears of contagion and was regarded as a risk to the Euro itself. It attained an unparalleled 
debt aid of 106 billion Euros, which is 55 percent of GDP (African Development Bank, 2012).  
The Greek debt was unsustainable and unwarranted. Wormell (2013) asserts that the National 
Debt of the United Kingdom (UK) is extraordinary in combining great age with recurrence.  
With a single concession, for over 300 years, the UK has not experienced a default; it has not 
been disconcerted by political rigmarole or inflation either (Wormell, 2013). During the 
culmination of the twentieth century, the UK Treasury still disburses £6.9 million each year for 
the interest of 2½ percent. The 1990s saw ubiquitous sub-national debt crises. To many 
observers, running away from regional debt in Mendoza, and Buenos Aires was a cardinal 
feature behind Argentina’s sovereign debt default in 2001. Brazil went through two sub-
national debt crises ensuring the early one in the 1980s. The Venezuela government 
experienced massive debts to its economy coupled with galloping inflation. 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) charted the issuance of the frame 
of reference with a feasibility testing platform concerning analysis and scholarly cooperation 
that encapsulated twelve emerging market countries (Antonakakis, 2013:1). The World Bank 
and IMF then issued a report in 2007 based on evaluating the degree of reinforcement of these 
states’ public debt management customs. Based on the appraisal of these states, they 
reinforced their public debt management customs and a report was issued in 2007 (Gunduz, 
2017:19).  
 
Mozambique, which was planned to take off as the third - biggest natural gas producer is 
instead now tottering on the edge of a major sovereign debt default which is jeopardising its 
eagerly anticipated gas fired boom. As a result, the International Monetary Fund, which had 
been working with Maputo to assist it disburse divulged debt of US$ 850 million, suspended 
the second instalment of a US$280 million loan to the country (Fabrics, 2016).  
 
The Namibian sovereign credit risk has been diminishing since the first rating was assessed 
from Fitch Ratings’ Agency in 2005. Namibia consequently received an augmenting and 
complementing credit rating from Moody’s Ratings Agency in 2011. By then, the two rating 
agencies have reviewed their vantage point for the Namibian economy on an annual basis, 
with perception to expounding the state’s rating as feasible. The sovereign rating has 
revitalised other corporates both private and state owned, to get their own credit scores. The 
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lower sovereign credit risk for the state was confirmed as well by the lower cost of borrowing 
by the government in the global markets when compared to its peers.  Moreover, the lower 
sovereign risk has also assisted in narrowing the spread between the South African 
benchmark bonds and the Namibia domestic state bonds. 
Even though Namibia’s State debt stock ballooned with acceleration between financial years 
2005/06 and 2012/13, it has despite that, remained within sustainable levels. In this scenario, 
a Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) was initiated for Namibia in 2013. The DSA found the 
fiscal state, as assessed by the ratio of total debt to GDP, to be mainly sustainable for the 
duration 2013-2014. Notwithstanding, the debt stock proceeds were monitored to make sure 
that sustainability is perpetuated. 
Figure 1.1 Namibia Debt-to-GDP Ratio and Real GDP Growth 2000-2016 
Source: Authors Computations with Data from the Bank of Namibia and the Namibia Statistics 
Agency (2019) 
The primary outcome of investigating the relationship between debt and GDP in this study is 
based on the fact that the economy of Namibia has unbearably diminished in GDP growth with 
a substantial fiscal deficit from 1999-2015. There is thus, a general argument that the natural 
increase in debt has caused high state expenditure and slow growth at the expense of revenue 
that has attracted deficit. This has attracted many questions on whether the sovereign debt 
for Namibia is sustainable or not.  
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1.2 Statement of Research Problem   
The increase in Namibia’s government debt over the past ten years, begs the question of 
medium to long term fiscal sustainability of the state debt, and doubts are being articulated 
about the possibility of Namibia sinking into debt distress that has affected several emerging 
economies.  
More worrying is the country’s credit rating that has seen a consistent downgrade by major 
credit rating agencies, which now stands at sub-investment grade, or what is often referred to 
as “junk status” (Moody's Investor Services, 2017:1). The main reasons quoted by Moody’s 
for this downgrade was an erosion of Namibia’s financial robustness due to large fiscal 
imbalances, an astronomic debt burden and limited institutional capacity to manage shocks 
and address long-term structural fiscal rigidities. 
In response to the challenges encountering the economy of Namibia due to the increase in 
sovereign debt and high state expenditure, “Namibian Government debt is worrying because 
its increasing rate causes grave implications”. These were the dispositions shared from the 
Namibian Finance Minister’s confirmation that the state debt’s increase to around 40 percent 
of GDP in the last two years may cause economic strains in the country (Confidente, 2015:3).  
The government debt is still one of the exasperating components in contemporary Namibian 
parliamentary debates. The sluggish economic growth and the increase in public debt remains 
a conundrum whether Namibia will be able to sustain its sovereign debt and manage it 
properly. Escalating issues such as unbudgeted land re-distribution pose a high state public 
debt threat, as articulated in the Fiscal Note of 2014. At the culmination of 2013, over 33 
percent of the total Central Government debt was short-term or maturing in less than a year. 
Pressure on resources has generated inflation as a by-product of state spending (Bank of 
Namibia , 2014). 
Even though debt sustainability assessments remain a judgmental exercise (International 
Monetary Fund, 2013), a country is said to have achieved fiscal sustainability when the ratio 
of government debt to GDP is stationary and declining in the long run (Zaaruka, Ndove, & 
Tjipe, 2004). 
A profound answer to the economic sustainability question, however, necessitates going 
beyond the state’s external debt (Hanson, 2016). Computation of the sustainability of 
aggregate central state debt, encapsulates  both foreign and domestic debt, some consensus 
has been that for government debt to be maintainable, it must be optimally structured 
(Zaaruka, Ndove, & Tjipe, 2004). 
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Like many other developing states, Namibia has been conversant with recurrent budget 
deficits and rising levels of central government debt. The foci of fiscal policy in Namibia 
concentrated on attracting employment, investment and alleviating poverty. This policy 
approach has put pressure on the state to increase expenditure, which led to an increase in 
budget deficits and consequently rising government debt. 
It is essential that research on the association of the Namibian sovereign debt to economic 
growth is prioritised in academic and government fiscal policy determination. It will provide a 
more defined stance to the much-debated Namibian government debt sustainability status as 
well as assist state debt managers in addressing operational and reputational risks that could 
emanate from non-sustainable debt levels. Debate on the relationship between sovereign debt 
and economic growth in Namibia has been based on socio-political arguments and inferred 
evidence. It is therefore a challenge to determine a robust long-run relationship between the 
two variables without a comprehensive examination. This study will further help policymakers 
develop relevant policy interventions once the establishment of the relationship between debt 
and GDP is concluded. 
Even though a great deal of literature exists on sovereign debt and economic growth for other 
countries globally, similar studies on the same phenomenon for Namibia in recent years are 
limited. A study conducted by Zaaruka, Ndove and Tjipe in 2004 on the central government 
debt sustainability for Namibia is outdated, and it forms the central literature for reference in 
most debates around the country’s state debt and its sustainability. While the study was 
conducted for Namibia, the methodology was focused on determining the sustainability and 
the optimal debt structure of state debt and not necessarily in determining the relationship 
between debt and economic growth.  
 
This research aims to provide empirical evidence that determines the relationship between 
central government debt and economic growth as well as local and foreign debt and economic 
growth in Namibia for the period 2000-2016.  
1.3 Research Questions 
There are two research questions in this study namely; 
1) What is the relationship between general government debt and economic growth in 
Namibia?  
2) What is the effect of local and foreign debt and economic growth in Namibia? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The principal objectives developed to achieve answers to the above questions are:  
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i. To determine the relationship between government debt and economic growth in 
Namibia. 
ii. To assess the impact of local and foreign debt and economic growth in Namibia. 
 
1.5 Hypothesis Testing  
The predominant purpose of a null hypothesis articulated in Salkind (2012:193) is that, “the 
null hypothesis acts as a starting point because it is the state of affairs that was accepted as 
true in the absence of other information”. The second idea of the null hypothesis is to furnish 
a standard of excellence against which observed outcomes, can be paralleled to determine 
whether probability causes these variations. Mumba (2013) delineates a hypothesis as a 
rational supposition correlation between two or more constructs uttered in the form of a 
testable pronouncement. The correlations are conceptualised linkages between two or more 
constructs articulated by the link of association established. This monograph is guided by the 
following hypotheses namely:  
𝐻𝑜: There is no relationship between the general government debt and economic growth in 
Namibia.  
𝐻𝑎: There is a negative relationship between the general government debt and economic 
growth in Namibia.  
1.6 Significance of the Research 
The Namibian State debt has rapidly increased during recent years, and its sustainability has 
been at the centre of much public debate. There are questions posed whether Namibia will be 
able to sustain the growing debt in the short to medium term given the shrinking fiscal capacity 
and widening of the fiscal deficit. Policy makers are assessing options to address these 
challenges especially given the deteriorating state of the Namibian sovereign credit rating over 
the years.  
 
Understanding the long-run sustainability of the Namibian state debt requires a study into the 
relationship between debt and economic growth which will shed light on the fiscal policy 
sustainability, to guide the future stance on fiscal policy determination. Studies have shown 
that Debt ceilings significantly hinge on fiscal conduct, and thus can be raised by a sound 
fiscal record. However, there is a great uncertainty about states’ performance at high debt 
levels, which is the main reason why countries put up debt ceilings (Jean-Marc & Falilou, 
2015). The recent case of Mozambique’s inability to meet obligations to international creditors 
resulted in the IMF suspending a further US$283 million credit to the country and other 
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development partners following suit, which led to the collapse of the country’s currency 
(Serumaga, 2017).   
 
The resolution of troubled economies’ defaults, as in the case of Southern American 
economies during the 1980s and Greece in 2013, involves passing on the risk of sovereign 
defaults to the taxpayers in the form of restructured economic programs as a requirement for 
transferring the debt to official creditors. The pressure of sovereign defaults weighs 
significantly on these economies as they lose access to the international credit market, 
resulting in such economies to be even more reliant on more loans from official creditors as a 
life-support mechanism. This pressure is likely to be huge in developing countries that are 
prone to more massive fiscal shocks such as Namibia. 
 
This study will assist policymakers in crafting sustainable fiscal policy techniques that support 
financial stability, particularly the Namibian government cash flow management. Appreciating 
the debt and GDP relationship for Namibia will aid inform liquidity management and planning 
policy. Further, escalated state debt levels could result into deteriorating sovereign risk credit 
ratings that renders the economy less attractive to investors and thus hindering economic 
development programs as the state struggles to attract investors to fund the fiscal deficit. 
 
It is critical that this study is conducted at this stage to guide long term policy development 
that informs whether there could be an optimal debt-GDP ratio structure that derives maximum 
economic returns for the country.  
1.7 Research Assumptions 
The assumptions in this study are that: 
a) The Namibian Government debt levels will steadily increase in the foreseeable future.  
b) The Namibian Government pursues economic development initiatives to improve the 
livelihood of its citizens.  
c) Sources of data such as Namibian Statistics Agency, Bank of Namibia and IMF are subject 
to thorough review processes, and hence reflect a fair representation of measures of GDP, 
government debt and other variables.  
1.8 Justification of the Study  
Research & Development-based models propose a quite ready correlation between research 
and economic growth:  the more research is executed, the higher the economy's long-run 
growth rate (Blanco & Prieger, 2013). State debt sustainability has been a subject of interest 
by universal Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The desideratum 
was to adopt a more robust position in making debt sustainability a vital condition for IMF 
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lending (IMF, 2016). However, for Namibia, the last published discourse conducted on 
government debt was in 2004 by the Bank of Namibia. The debt structure has since fluctuated 
as the debt to GDP ratio has been on the increase. The debt-to-GDP ratio ceiling used in the 
2004 paper has since varied from 25 percent to 35 percent currently. Consequently, it is 
valuable to conduct this study given the time that elapsed and the changes in macroeconomic 
constructs. Moreover, findings and actions offered on the fiscal policy path that is harmonious 
with state debt in the future for Namibia could prove useful to other countries with similar 
economic features as Namibia.  
1.9 Organization of the Research  
This discourse is subdivided into five (5) chapters. The remainder of the paper is as follows: 
Chapter 2 focuses on a literature review that unravels a perspective of debt to GDP 
relationship, external borrowing by the government and theories on debt sustainability. It also 
demonstrates theoretical models for potential indicators that can be helpful in evaluating the 
viability of Namibia’s state debt. The chapter further highlights research gaps that could be 
filled by this study. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology and discusses the research methods used to 
collect and analyse the data. It also provides the data sources and the justification for the 
variables.  Chapter 4 analyses and discusses the research findings in the context of what other 
similar studies quoted in the literature review found. Chapter 5 summarises the research 
results, draws conclusions and provides policy recommendations and future research areas 
in relation to this study.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 2.1 Introduction  
This chapter unravels a distinct viewpoint of the correlation between state debt and economic 
growth, debt sustainability assessment avenues, external borrowing by the state and schools 
of thought on debt sustainability. The chapter presents a non-structural outlook to pinpointing 
theoretical models for potential determinants that can be helpful in evaluating the relationship 
between Namibia’s state debt and economic growth.  
2.2 Definition of Debt Sustainability  
The IMF and the World Bank portray debt sustainability of a state as its proficiency and 
disposition to meet concurrent and future debt service burdens in full, without remedy to debt 
postponement or accumulation of debts and without conceding growth (IMF, 2013). This 
delineation was acknowledged by global critiques in application to debt sustainability analysis. 
A plethora of indicators among others, such as debt-to-export ratios and the debt service to 
export ratio were deployed.  Debt analysis embracing both stock and debt service concepts 
correlated with a state’s potential reimbursement capacity (Krugman, 2014). Nonetheless, no 
single exposition attracts all the essentials of debt sustainability. For instance, a state can 
have a diminished debt service ratio and a comparatively high net present value (NPV) of 
debt-to-exports ratio contingent to the blueprint of debt recompense  (Zaaruka, Ndove, & Tjipe, 
2004). 
2.3 Namibia Sovereign Debt Sustainability and Economic Growth  
The research consummated by IMF (2013) enunciates that the state debt should not 
accumulate expeditiously than nominal GDP. The fundamental logic is that expenditure, for 
debt sustained, should beyond a shadow of doubt contribute to GDP growth and in so doing, 
propel a reciprocal increase in state revenue to service the debt. Taking into cognisance, some 
ideology to this rationale, Namibia performed favourably in managing the debt since the 
execution of the Sovereign Debt Management Strategy in 2005. Even though Namibia’s state 
debt stock developed with acceleration between fiscal years 2005/06 and 2012/13, it has 
nevertheless remained within sustainable levels. In this situation, a Debt Sustainability 
Analysis (DSA) was taken on board for Namibia in 2013. The DSA unearthed that the 
economic position of the state as assessed by the ratio of total debt/GDP was most 
sustainable for the period 2013-2014 (Bank of Namibia , 2014). 
2.3.1 Debt Sustainability Assessment (DSA) Approaches   
There is a plethora of dissertations to date on state debt sustainability, and sovereign debt 
sustainability has become a vital financial health indicator for states amongst others. 
Unambiguously, articulated in the wake of sovereign debt crises in European, Latin America 
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as well as sub-Saharan African states (Charles, 2005). Woden and Counter (2012) unpack 
that there are a variety of approaches used to analyse debt sustainability, such as World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF), the HIPC Initiative, the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the European Union’s Maastricht Treaty. 
 
The World Bank’s GDF classifications on external indebtedness is incumbent upon two 
dimensions, the ratio of the NPV of  the sum  external debt (computed  based on all future 
debt service) to the three-year backward-looking mean of gross national product (GNP). If 
either ratio is more than a critical value, 80 percent for the NPV-debt-to-GNP ratio and 220 
percent for the NPV-debt-to-exports ratio, the state is considered to be plentifully indebted. If 
the critical value is not more than but either ratio is three-fifths or more of the critical value 
(that is, 48 percent for present value of debt service to GNP and 132 percent for present value 
of debt service to exports), the state is categorised as moderately indebted. If both ratios are 
less than three-fifths of the critical value, the state is categorised as less indebted (Woden & 
Counter, 2012). 
 
The IMF has a DSA program crafted for Article IV consultations. These DSAs scrutinise both 
the public and external debts exclusively from Ley’s algebra approach. Cline (2012) mooted a 
new probabilistic approach to sovereign debt forecasting that could furnish conjectures of debt 
ratios through to decades into the future. This approach considers ostensible connexions 
across 243 alternate abstracts with three states (Cline, 2012). The state of Namibia put in 
place Sovereign Debt Management Strategy risk yardsticks to lead the administration of the 
debt portfolio and to ensure that state borrowing was executed with an acceptable degree of 
risk. Figure 2.1 shows that for the duration 2012 the total debt/GDP for Namibia was within 
comfortable benchmark levels, but for other variables such as foreign debt/GDP, total debt 
service/ revenue and external debt/total debt, they were not within the determined target. 
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Figure 2.1 Namibia Debt Performance Against GDP 
 
Source: Bank of Namibia (2014)  
2.3.2 Domestic and External Borrowing by the Government  
Many emerging states are incumbent upon foreign investors to hold a conspicuous 
disbursement of their debt. This foreign debt is usually comprised of external borrowing and 
some states, even a significant fraction of the locally held debt is designated in exchange. The 
options between local and external borrowing are varied and demonstrate four germane 
dimensions namely; macroeconomic; public options; debt maintenance; and balance sheets. 
The macroeconomic modulations between local and external borrowing in the short extension 
are that state borrowing locally drives up domestic interest rates, and so crowds out private 
sector borrowing (Masengo, 2016). The public choice magnitude makes sure that the 
malicious consequences of excessive state borrowing are felt immediately through higher 
local interest rates (Hawkins & Turner, 2009:27).  
2.3.3 Namibia External Debt and Other States   
Multinationals are construed to be the cardinal source of external credit to Kenya; 
notwithstanding, their relative share has diminished since 2011. In the same vein, the share 
of reciprocal creditors, the second most crucial source of external credit, has retrogressed 
since 2010. Kenya was not endorsed from debt relief under either the HIPC or MDRI 
astuteness (International Monetary Fund, 2013). Namibia, Rwanda, and Uganda have 
managed to preserve their debt to some governable levels. 
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Figure 2.2 External Public Debt as % of GDP in Selected African Countries 2012 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
2.4 Theories of Debt and Economic Growth  
2.4.1 State Debt Risk of Default: A Political-Economic Theory of the Strategic Role of Debt  
Dornbusch and Draghi (2011) assert that most belligerent literature on macroeconomic 
codification was about when and whether debt-financed state deficits have real effects on total 
output and employment (Dornbusch & Draghi, 2011). This challenge has been classically 
unraveled in a model of a representative agent interweaving with a compassionate state 
maximising social welfare function. Placidly, only a limited set of challenges can be attended 
within this frame of reference. Blanchard and Fischer (1989) developed a model to study 
whether an increase in the state financial plan deficit and public commitment leads to a rise in 
real interest rate. They found that real interest rates are based on projected categorization of 
debt or on the current obligation levels and the anticipated order of government deficits 
(Blanchard & Fischer, 1989).  Subsequently, a chiefly crucial feature of fiscal policy repressed 
in this model, is the redistributive stimulus of fiscal policy and the resultant political rigmarole 
emanating from these distributional concerns.  
2.4.2 Confidence Crisis Theory and Public Debt Management   
Central banks strive to be outspoken about the prevailing nominal exchange-rate parity and 
trails of monetary policy, unfluctuating with unspecified exchange-rate stability (Aizema, 
2013). While fundamentals are unswerving with the prevailing parity, in some events, the 
interlocution between the private sector and the Treasury can lead to an effectual attack on 
the central bank and compel it to devalue the currency. The erosion of a confidence is a crisis, 
multifarious in this regard, since a crisis can take place not only if the public is discombobulated  
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that the  state  might not honour its debt, however also if it dreads that the central bank might 
reject the fixed parity (Arslanap & Tsuda, 2012). Before motivating this modelling strategy, it 
is worth offering a quick synopsis of the analysis to explicate how a speculative attack on the 
currency links up with debt management challenges. This study argues that investor 
confidence is significant for Namibia sovereign debt sustainability because it boosts investor 
demand which is crucial for economic development. 
2.4.3 The Relationship Between Sovereign Debt and Economic Growth 
The scrutiny of public debt in emerging states has ceremoniously focused on external debt. 
Previous theories have concentrated on foreign debt for two main motives; first, while foreign 
borrowing can raise a country’s access to assets, local borrowing only transfers’ resources 
within the nation. Therefore, only the external debt attracts a “transfer” challenge  (Keyness, 
1994:7). Second, since central banks in emerging states cannot print the money necessary to 
reimburse external debt and foreign borrowing, the mean per capita revenue diminishes 
regardless of the high assistance injection flows (Panizza, 2010). This consequence 
stimulates aid donor agencies and academia to see in the new light the earlier deliberations 
on the efficacy of foreign aid (Lancaster, 2014). The high convergence of foreign aid also 
instills a dependency syndrome. 
2.4.4 Sovereign Debt Sustainability Theory 
The theoretical literary works suggest that those states which are conversant in rapid 
economic growth can sustain  more when they  are  more bound and determined with  current 
account deficits without increasing their external debt about national output, provided they 
have positive capital inflows (Hawkins & Turner, 2009:27). Consequently, this leads to a 
dwindling foreign debt. Even though the multiplication of tangible capital through debt 
sustainability can embellish a state’s resourcefulness to service its external debt 
commitments, the net impact depends on productivity shocks and their effect on debt 
sustainability and national output (North, 1999). The irrefutable local fiscal architecture has 
the behavior on the state’s capability to sustain its external public debt responsibilities. When 
domestic financial markets become included in the global capital markets, well operational 
and well-regulated capital markets are indispensable (OECD, 2013). The challenges of the 
large-scale banking sector that have emerged in a plethora of both developed and emerging 
nations in the early 1980s and 1990s have raised the alarm about the consequences of these 
challenges (IMF, 2013). Collard, Habib and Roched (2015) developed a measure of maximum 
sustainable government debt for advanced economies. They took into account how much 
investors are willing to lend to a country's government depending on the country's expected 
primary surplus, the level and volatility of its rate of growth, and how much debt the 
government expects to be able to raise in the future for the purpose of servicing the debt it 
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seeks to raise at present. They calibrated the measures for 23 OECD countries and tested the 
relation between sovereign yield spreads and the theoretical probability of default at prevailing 
debt levels, and found it to be strongly statistically significant (Collard, Habib, & Rochet, 2015). 
2.4.5 Real Interest Rates Theory 
World Bank (2013) shows that, public debt sustainability is triggered by economic growth of 
the national economy, real interest rates and primary balance. A real interest rate that 
transcend the real growth rate and primary surplus is  equal to sustainable levels (Asteriou & 
Hall, 2007). The sustainable level is that which keeps the debt stock as a ratio of GDP 
constant. The capability of a state  to buoy up  its external public debt is not only susciptible  
to the size and the life of accessible liabilities and the stock of its foreign assets but also the 
quantum  of its debt-servicing weight (IMF, 2013). The IMF (2013) further postulates that the 
effect will, however, depend on other determinants such as variations in the macroeconomic 
habitat of the local economy, the foreign public debt to GDP ratio and the interest rate 
configuration of the loans. Interest rates impact  the borrowers’ adequacy  and consequently, 
should have a positive impact on credit risk, an upsurge  in sovereign debt is anticipated to 
activate an increase in loan delinquency.   
2.5 The Study’s Main Argument  
Government debt is like the nuclear energy that can be used for “good or evil”. To a certain 
extent, this statement is valid. Borrowing money to make more money, such as for opening a 
soon-to-be profitable business, does make sense (Business Mirror, 2017:2). The study argues 
that debt is a two-edged sword. Used wisely and in moderation, it improves welfare. However, 
when it is used indiscreetly and in excess, the result can be a disaster. The study argues that 
to avoid a sovereign debt crisis, sound governance practices should be adhered to. For 
individual households and firms, over-borrowing leads to bankruptcy and financial ruin. For a 
nation, too much debt impairs the state’s ability to deliver essential services to its citizens. The 
study supports the view that, beyond a certain level, debt is bad for growth. The study argues 
that high domestic borrowing and expenditure by government impacts the economic growth 
of the state. 
The discourse further argues that at low levels, debt is excellent as it is a predecessor  of 
economic growth and stability. However, at high concentrations, private and public arrears are 
acrimonious, upsurging volatility and choking off growth. It is in this sense that borrowing can 
first be beneficial, so long as it is modest (Shabbir, 2013). The study argues that government 
debt has the paramount implication that a highly responsible state should not only aim at 
counterbalancing their debt but also at diminishing it to sufficiently low levels that do not retard 
growth. The study argues that governments should also aim to keep their debt well below the 
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estimated thresholds so that even extraordinary events are unlikely to push their debt to levels 
that become unsustainable and damaging to growth (Granvit, 2010). 
2.5.1 Arguments Supporting State Borrowing 
The primary argument of having state debt is that it allows the state to do more things than it 
otherwise could. Good debt is when one takes a loan to invest in an asset that returns more 
than the cost of the debt (Hesse, Bakhache, & Asonuma, 2015). A business might buy a 
delivery truck or a website; a family might purchase a car, so a parent can get a better job 
further away or borrow to send their kids to college. This is like borrowing money to buy a 
house which allows to do more things.  If the state uses its debt wisely (by investing), this is 
fine (Gecchetti, Mohanty, & Zampoli, 2014). A second argument is that borrowing allows the 
state to be flexible in fiscal policy. The closest match to 'good debt' that governments take on 
is large infrastructure projects that private institutions cannot or won't fund, such as 
universities, roads, trains, basic research and communication lines (Jenkins, 2015). Since 
these are long-term investments, governments borrow money against the expected growth in 
the overall economy.  
Hanson (2016) unravels that governments must improve the lives of their citizens. Typically, 
they fund this through taxes, but often taxes are not enough to cover necessary expenditures 
in the short term, so states must borrow.  If a state has no debt, it has no way to vitalise the 
economy during a recession  (Hanson, 2016).  The sovereign debt can promote productivity 
such as the case of Japan. If a state has no debt, like China, it cannot prove that it is credit-
worthy. If it suddenly needs to borrow, it must pay high interest rates  (Ogunmuyiwa, 2011). 
The main argument for preserving or investing in state debt is usually attributed to the 
purchasing of treasury bonds. For example, foreign states and affluent individuals own most 
of America's national debt in this manner  (Cowell, 2011).   
Firstly, one of the arguments supporting sovereign bonds is their very low risk. In many cases, 
such as in the American scenario they are called risk- free bonds. Consequently, these bonds 
are suitable for investors who fear the volatility of certain investments and prefer a safe place 
for an investor in a market with instabilities. Secondly; sovereign bonds are liquid. The naked 
truth is that they are purchased and sold on the open market every day. By issuing bonds, the 
state can have new cash flow to spend to achieve specific national objectives. Without finance 
and debt, countries will likely be poor and stay poor. When they can borrow, they prove their 
creditworthiness and at the same time achieve national objectives that contribute to the 
broadening of the production base of the economy (IMF, 2013).  
 
 
15 
 
2.5.2 Arguments Against State Borrowing  
Too much debt can cause high inflation, which is not good for any economy. Without a 
functional democracy allowing citizen control, it can lead to frivolous expending and unfitting 
portfolio (this may have happened in China the last few years, with their 'ghost states' and 
highways to nowhere) (Gecchetti, Mohanty, & Zampoli, 2014). Gecchetti et al., further 
advocate the perception that, beyond a certain level, debt is acrimonious for growth. For state 
debt, the quantum is about 85 percent of GDP. For corporate debt, the threshold is closer to 
90 percent. Moreover, for household borrowing, reported parameters are around 85 percent 
of GDP, although the impact is very vaguely estimated.  The outcome for state debt has the 
implication that highly responsible states should not only aim at stabilising their debt but also 
at reducing it to sufficiently low levels that do not retard growth (Granvit, 2010). Diligence 
dictates that states should also foci to keep their debt well below the estimated thresholds so 
that even extraordinary events are unlikely to push their debt to levels that become damaging 
to growth (Smith, 2012). 
 
However, fiscal progression is not some necromancy potion. The cumulation  of debt 
encapsulates risk. As debt levels  surge, the ability to disburse becomes progressively more 
impressionable to drops in income as well as increases in interest rates (Raffer, 2010). For a 
given shock, the higher the debt, the higher is the probability of defaulting (Business Mirror, 
2017:2). Even for a mild shock, highly accountable borrowers may abruptly no longer be 
concerned as credit-worthy. Moreover, when lenders stop lending, consumption and 
investment shrink. If the downturn is terrible, defaults, insufficient demand, and high 
unemployment might be the grim result (Senanayake, 2012). The higher the level of arrears, 
the more significant the drop for a given size of a shock to the economy. Moreover, the more 
significant the bubble in aggregate activity, the higher the probability that governments will not 
be able to make disbursements on their non-state-contingent debt (Lexuan, 2011).  
2.6 Empirical Studies on State Debt and Economic Growth 
Empirical literature on the correlation between government debt and economic growth within 
emerging market economies is scant. The scrutiny of public debt in poor states has in 
established usage focused primarily on external debt in developed economies. Studies 
knuckle down on foreign debt for two main qualifications; first, while foreign borrowing can 
raise a country’s access to assets, local borrowing only transfers’ resources within the nation. 
Therefore, only the external debt attracts a “transfer” challenge (Keyness, 1994:7). Second is 
because Central banks in emerging states cannot print the money necessary to reimburse 
external debt and foreign borrowing (Panizza, 2010). This ramification stimulates aid donor 
agencies and fundi to have second thoughts on the deliberations of the efficacy on foreign aid 
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(Lancaster, 2014). The high inundation of foreign aid has also displayed a dependency 
syndrome. 
Recent studies that investigated the relationship between state debt and economic growth are 
such as that conducted by Swamy (2014) on the dynamics of state debt and economic growth 
which found that as the debt regimes rise there is a decrease in GDP growth levels (Swamy, 
2014). Other studies showing that there is a negative correlation between state debt and 
economic growth are such as that by (Krugman 2010, and Adamu et al., 2018). Such studies 
found that the negative correlation becomes particularly strong when state debt approaches 
100 percent of GDP. Studies cited the case of Japan, reasoning that the relationship between 
debt and growth could be motivated by the fact that it is low economic growth that leads to 
high levels of state debt (Krugman, 2010). 
Ballasone et al., (2011) analysed the relation between the ratio of public debt relative 
to GDP and the growth rate of real per capita income in Italy over 1861-2009. Their findings 
support the theories of an adverse relation between public debt and growth and of a stronger 
effect of foreign debt compared to domestic debt before World War I (Ballasone, Francese, & 
Pace, 2011).  Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) investigated the relationship between public 
debt and long-run growth in a large sample of countries by modelling potential nonlinearity 
within and across countries in the debt–growth relationship. Their evidence supports a 
negative relationship between debt and growth across countries, but they could not find 
substantiation for nonlinearities within states for a common debt threshold (Eberhardt & 
Presbitero, 2015). A study by Ogunmuyiwa (2011) scrutinised if external debt promotes 
economic growth in Nigeria using time series data from 1970 to 2007 and the results indicate 
that causality does not exist between external debt and economic growth (Ogunmuyiwa, 
2011).  
External debt for Nigeria possesses a negative impact on economic growth while domestic 
debt has a positive impact on economic growth (Umaru, Aminu, & Musa, 2013). Umaru et al., 
further inferred that a good performance of an economy regarding per capita growth might be 
attributed to the level of domestic debt and not on the level of external debt in the country. 
External debt is therefore considered as unfavourable to the economic progress of a country.  
Kumara and Nawalage (2013) found that, above the threshold level for public debt of 59.42 
percent, public debt makes a negative impact on GDP per capita growth. Pegkas (2018) 
investigated the relationship between economic growth and several factors including 
government debt in Greece. Their results indicate that the relationship between debt and 
growth depends on the debt breaks. Specifically, at debt levels before year 2000, increases 
in the government debt-to-GDP ratio are associated with insignificant effects on economic 
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growth. However, as government debt rises after year 2000, the effect on economic growth 
diminishes rapidly and the growth impacts become negative (Pegkas, 2018). 
AKRAM (2017) examined the consequences of public debt for economic growth and 
investment in Sri Lanka, for the period 1975-2014 by using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
Model (ARDL) technique. The findings reveal that public external debt has helped the process 
of economic growth, but debt servicing has a negative relationship to per capita GDP and 
investment. The study also found that domestic debt has positive and significant relationship 
with per capita GDP (AKRAM, 2017) 
The debt-growth nexus depends on institutions and policies (Presbitero, 2008). These are 
inferences from a study that investigated the relationship between external debt and economic 
growth over 114 developing countries, focusing on the role played by the policy and 
institutional framework. Findings from this study suggest that external debt proves to be 
irrelevant for countries with weak institutions and that efficient debt relief policies should be 
tailored to country-specific characteristics and conditional to a certain level of institutional 
quality as debt overhang seems to be at work exclusively in countries with sound institutions. 
A study on Sri Lanka investigated the long run relationship of public debt on economic growth 
of the country for the period 1977 -2012, using time series data by employing Johansen test 
of cointegration analysis which relies on Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). Findings point 
to a disequilibrium that is corrected at the speed of 58 percent over each year, which suggest 
a significant error correction term as indicative evidence of the existence of long run 
relationship (Munashinghe, Attapattu, & Padmasiri, 2018:775). 
Dreger and Reimers (2013) documented the correlation of the debt ratio on the real GDP per 
capita growth rate for two assemblages of states, euro-zone contributors and non-euro-zone. 
They exploited a pooled panel regression and made pronouncements of a negative impact of 
the debt ratio on economic growth  (Dreger & ReImers, 2013). On the convergence, there 
exist pragmatic surveys that only find a negative correlation between the debt to GDP ratio 
and economic growth  (Greiner & Fincke, 2015). Ferreira (2012), for instance, executed 
Granger causality tests for 20 OECD states over the time from 1988–2001, where they 
surveyed annual growth rates. They found that the higher debt to GDP ratios applies an 
adverse effect on the growth rates of economies. The impact was found to be statistically 
significant, and it goes in both directions that is, the higher public debt diminishes economic 
growth, and less growth implies higher state debt (Ferreira, 2012). Kumar and Woo (2010) 
analyse 19 states over the duration from 1970 -2007, where they estimate growth regressions 
with the growth rate over five years as the dependent variable. The result of their computations 
found a negative relationship between the debt to GDP ratio at the commencement of a period 
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and the growth rate of that period (Kumar & Woo, 2010).  In addition, they investigated the 
relation between public deficits and economic growth and also detected a negative correlation.  
Non-sustainable debt-ratios above and below the 60 percent threshold, have a harmful effect 
on short-run economic growth, while sustainable debt-ratios below the 90 percent threshold 
exert a positive influence on short-run economic growth (Antonakakis, 2013:1). This was a 
finding that emanated from the examination of the role of non-sustainable debt thresholds. 
IMF (2013) carried out research on sovereign debt restructuring focusing on current trends 
and implication for the Fund’s legal and policy frame of reference. The research focused on 
the various policies and customs that predicate market access, arrears and employment of 
statutory instruments. The debt re-establishment was reckoned as being too little and too late 
therefore failing to stabilize debt sustainability and market access. The IMF (2013) research 
differs from the works of Ullah (2014), who made a review of European sovereign debt crisis 
focusing on the causes and consequences, the crisis was precipitated by global trade in 
equilibrium, the impact of the 2007-2012 and the flash in the pan in bailout approaches to uplift 
Europe from the conundrums of global financial crisis.  Significant growth was attributed from 
the introduction of the Euro currency and caused a sharp rise in bond yields (Ullah, 2014). 
Afonso and Jalles (2011) used a panel of 155 countries to assess the links between growth, 
productivity and government debt by examining simultaneity, endogeneity, cross-section 
dependence, nonlinearities, and threshold effects via growth equations. Their finding was that, 
for the OECD, the higher the debt maturity the higher economic growth and thus higher debt 
ratios are beneficial to total factor productivity growth (Afonso & Jalles, 2011).  
In their examination of the management and sustainability of external debt on the emerging 
economies of Africa, Muhanji and Ojah (2011) found that maintaining external debt-to-GDP 
sustainable levels of 80 percent helps African countries from falling into debt crises. They 
further found that failure to determine appropriate levels of sustainable external debt, 
inadequate effective governance infrastructure, and ineffective management of external 
shocks, are the main justifications for the persistence of Africa’s external debt problems 
(Muhanji & Ojah, 2011:185). Mukuddem-Petersen et al., (2013) focused on the impact of state 
expenditure on the Greek state debt. The methodology employed was a vector error correction 
model frame of reference and Granger causality model. The results showed a significant 
negative relationship between state debt and gross national income (Mukuddem-Petersen, 
Mah, Miruka, & Petersen, 2013). The study also found a significant positive relationship 
between state debt, gross national expenditure and foreign direct investment.  
Another research was carried out by Muyaba (2016) to analyse the impact of state expenditure 
on the economic growth in Zambia. The study employed a Granger Causality Test and simple 
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regression. The study by Muyaba (2016) used public expenditure and economic growth as 
variables, and the empirical findings demonstrated that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between public expenditure and economic growth in Zambia. (Muyaba, 2016). 
Fournier and Fall (2015) researched the limits to state debt sustainability with the purpose to 
compute endogenous state debts limits given the markets evaluations of the likelihood to 
default. The survey was done to look at the frames of references to OECD nations over the 
duration 1985-2013. The findings were that the debt limits were astronomical for most of the 
OECD countries. The outcome unraveled that the present debt levels were not sustainable 
without a change in the state behavior as juxtaposed to the past (Fournier & Fall, 2015). 
Zaaruka, Ndove and Tjipe (2004) conducted research on the central government debt 
sustainability for Namibia by deploying the cointegration approach and Rule of Thumb. They 
concluded that the state budget deficit was sustainable and will be sustainable in the medium 
term. The research also alluded to the fact that high-interest rates and low real economic 
growth are acrimonious for debt sustainability (Zaaruka, Ndove, & Tjipe, 2004). 
Sayed (2004) researched the growth in Botswana ‘s external public debt sustainability. Their 
study employed the Unit Root test, residual test for stationarity and Granger Causality test. 
The findings were that Botswana’s sovereign debt was sustainable and the country can still 
borrow to finance its deficit (Sayed, 2004). 
Adamu et al., (2018) analysed the relationship between debt variables and economic growth 
within the Solow (1956) growth framework. Their study assumed the Autoregressive 
Distributive Lag (ARDL) model and applied on time-series data for Nigeria spanning between 
1981 and 2016, and the results indicate that external debt is negatively related with economic 
growth in both short and long run. The evidence suggests that increase in external debt will 
lead to a decline in economic growth and as such, debt service obligation should not be 
allowed to rise more than foreign exchange earnings (Adamu, Salihu, Musa, Abdullahi, & 
Bello, 2018). 
Ying-Hui (2014) conducted an empirical analysis on 14 resource-exhausting cities in China 
focusing on the evaluation system of the state debt sustainability. The study unpacked that 
state debts resource regions have challenges in the scale appropriateness and sustainability. 
The study proposed the state debt sustainability concepts of aiming to maximise the 
proficiency of debt capital distribution under challenges of the optimisation of regional debt 
systems. The analysis demonstrates the full indexes which play a pivotal role in the 
assessment of the index system of local state debt risk (Ying-Hui, 2014). 
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On managing foreign debt and liquidity risk, the principal objective of government debt 
management in Belgium was to lessen the financial debt service cost, subject to certain 
margins prescribed by the management of related risks, as well as by the general objectives 
of budgetary and monetary policy. A consolidated debt-to-GDP ratio of 105.8 percent and debt 
service costs totaling 6.0 percent of GDP in 2002 highlight that risk management of the Belgian 
state debt is fundamental (Hawkins & Turner, 2009:27).  Absurdly, a proportion of the debt 
and the high share of debt service costs in the state expenditures infer that unfavorable shocks 
such as higher interest rates have a substantial impact on the budget. Asymmetrically, 
European Union rules demand that the Debt - GDP ratio must decline at an acceptable rate 
vis-à-vis the reference rate of 60.0 percent. 
States which are acquainted with rapid economic growth can sustain higher and more resolute 
current account deficits without accumulating their external debt about national output, 
provided they have a positive capital influx. This will usually lead to a decrease in foreign debt. 
Although the accumulation of tangible capital through debt sustainability can enhance a 
country's resourcefulness to service its external debt commitments, the net impact depends 
on productivity shocks and their effect on debt sustainability and national output (North, 1999). 
Charan (2012) scrutinized the effect of domestic debt on economic growth in India. They 
settled that the unanticipated component of domestic debt affects growth (Charan, 2012). In 
addition, the Ricardian uniformity speak highly that it does not matter whether state funds its 
expanding debt, because the effect on the total level of demand in an economy is just the 
same (Christensen, 2010). Christensen (2010) further argues that state debt has a positive 
impact on the economy. When the state debt is high, it tends to positively affect the economic 
growth since interest rates will also be high and this will have a direct repercussion on 
consumption. 
Pattillo (2011) assessed the non-linear impact of external debt on growth using panel data for 
93 developing countries. Their findings were that for a country with average indebtedness, 
doubling the debt ratio reduces growth by a third to a half percentage point after controlling for 
endogeneity. Their findings also suggest that the average impact of debt becomes negative 
at about 160–170 percent of exports or 35–40 percent of GDP and the marginal impact of debt 
at about half of these values (Pattillo, 2011:3).  
In an attempt to estimate the determinants of external debt distress in low-income countries 
(LICs), Gunduz (2017) found that weak economic institutions tend to raise the probability of 
debt distress through persistently weak economic policies and high vulnerability to external 
shocks (Gunduz, 2017:19). The inference from the finding is that, “countries that defaulted on 
their debt had  worse policy records (high macroeconomic instability, large external deficits, 
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and low level of reserves) and were more exposed to adverse external shocks compared to 
the countries that did not experience debt distress” (Gunduz, 2017:19). 
2.7 Research Gaps  
This review of the literature shows many directions for further study in the sovereign debt and 
economic growth within the context of Namibia or a developing economy within an African 
context. The following research gaps in sovereign debt, research models, study settings and 
methodology were identified.  
2.7.1 Sovereign Debt and Economic Growth 
Previous research on sovereign debt and economic growth by Collard et al., (2015) focused 
on sovereign debt sustainability for advanced economies for 23 OECD countries. They 
employed the probability of default as a proportion of GDP ratio. This research fills a gap in 
which it focused on the Namibian perspective with much emphasis on the relationship of debt 
to GDP. IMF (2017) researched public investment, growth and debt sustainability in which 
they targeted low-income countries. Other studies by Krugman (2010), Ballasone (2011) and 
Pegkas (2018) focused on the debt-to-GDP relationship in developed economies. This 
research fills a gap in that it focused on Namibia, which is classified by the IMF as an upper-
middle income country. 
2.7.2 Research Models 
Previous research by Berg et al., (2012) developed a model to study the macroeconomic 
effects of public investment surges in low-income countries, with consideration of public 
external and domestic debt accumulation and the fiscal policy reactions necessary to ensure 
debt-sustainability. They found that higher domestic interest rates increase the financing 
challenge and crowds out private investment and consumption. “With poor execution, sluggish 
fiscal policy reactions, or persistent negative exogenous shocks, this strategy can easily lead 
to unsustainable public debt dynamics” (Berg, Portillo, Buffie, Patillio, & Zanna, 2012:19). The 
UNCTAD Global Policy Model furnishes some macro-pecuniary analytical frames of 
references having different constructs on an integrated macro-economic model for the world 
economy which has various sets of analysis of debt sustainability. This rubric fills the gap that 
it employed the Deutschland et al., (2014) new conceptual frame of reference for state debt 
management. The dependent variable for the frame of reference is Namibia GDP, and 
explanatory variables are Namibia government debt and control variables of inflation and 
foreign direct investment.  
2.7.3 Study Setting  
Outstandingly, most of the research has been conducted in Western states mainly in the USA 
and the European Union area. Remarkably, there has been an insufficient study in a non-
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western context concerning this topic. To ensure the simplification and applicability of the 
theory, model, hypotheses and measurement scales in different contexts, empirical research 
should be expanded to other developing states such as Namibia.  
2.7.4 Methodology 
Mukuddem-Petersen et al., (2013) conducted and econometric analysis, focusing on the 
impact of state expenditure on the Greece state debt employing the methodology of the vector 
error correction model frame of reference and Granger causality model. Studies by 
Munashinghe et al., (2018) also emplyed the vector error correction model to investigate the 
long run relationship of public debt on economic growth for Sri Lanka. This study is different 
in that it employs Unit Root Test, ARDL approach and Granger Causality Test in assessing 
the relationship between sovereign debt and GDP of Namibia. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapters presents the discussion of the research approach and the design applied in 
achieving the objectives.  
3.2 Research Design and Strategy  
The analysis in this study uses a quantitative approach to assess the relationship between 
state debt and economic growth. The quantitative data is advantageous as it can be easier to 
make predictions based on the results. It allows for the possibility to make the inferences from 
quantitative research generalizable as statistical analysis are often considered reliable where 
systematic, standardised comparisons are needed.  
3.3 Quantitative Method Research Design 
There are three research designs, namely: qualitative research design, quantitative research 
design and mixed research design (Creswell, 2014). Creswell (2014) specifies that research 
designs are types of inquiry within qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approach that 
furnish specific direction for procedures in research. This study sought to follow the 
quantitative research approach in examining the relationship between government debt and 
economic growth for Namibia. The acceptance of the quantitative method approach for this 
discourse is aimed to furnish an objective analysis of the research problem by using research 
techniques designed to analyse quantitative data.  
3.4 Data period and Source  
Quarterly nominal data on government debt, foreign debt and domestic debt were obtained 
from the Bank of Namibia Quarterly and Annual Reports as well as the Research Department 
and subsequently converted and expressed in US Dollars at the market exchange rates to the 
Namibian dollar also obtained from the Bank of Namibia database. Quarterly average inflation 
percentages were obtained from the Bank of Namibia online database. Annual foreign direct 
investment as percentage of GDP were obtained from IMF Data Mapper and converted to 
quarterly percentages by simply dividing the annual values by 4, to maintain the frequency 
consistency of all variables. The quarterly GDP statistics at market prices were obtained from 
the Namibia Statistics Agency online database. The sources and definition of the quantitative 
data used in this study are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 3.1 Description of Variables 
  
NO VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
1 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) 
QUARTERLY GDP FIGURES AT MARKET 
PRICES USED TO REPRESENT ECONOMIC 
GROWTH (2000Q1-2016Q4), EXPRESSED IN 
US DOLLARS 
NAMIBIA 
STATISTICS 
AGENCY 
2 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 
(GDEBT) 
QUARTERLY OUTSTANDING GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT DEBT EXPRESSED IN US 
DOLLARS 
BANK OF 
NAMIBIA 
3             FOREIGN DEBT (FXD) 
QUARTERLY OUTSTANDING EXTERNAL DEBT 
COMPONENT EXPRESSED IN US DOLLARS 
BANK OF 
NAMIBIA 
       
4 LOCAL DEBT(LOCALD) 
QUARTERLY OUTSTANDING LOCAL DEBT 
COMPONENT EXPRESSED IN US DOLLARS 
BANK OF 
NAMIBIA 
5 INFLATION (INFL) 
QUARTERLY CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
PERCENTAGE VALUES 
BANK OF 
NAMIBIA 
6 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) 
NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AS 
PERCENTAGE OF GDP.  
 
IMF DATA 
MAPPER 
 Source: Author (2018) 
3.5 Specification of the Model 
From the literature review, the study adopts similar models to those of Umaru et al., (2013), 
AKRAM (2017) and Adamu et al., (2018) which were adjusted to fit the Namibian situation. 
A regression analysis is then derived mainly to study the association between the dependent 
and independent variables. The independent/explanatory variables are namely; general 
government debt (GDEBT), foreign debt (FXD) and local debt (LOCALD). Inflation (INFL) and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) were also introduced as control variables on the right-hand 
side of the equation. The dependent variable is economic growth (GDP). The relationship 
between GDP and the various debt categories is proposed in a linear relationship as: 
GDP = 𝛽Debtst, + 𝛾𝑋t, + 𝜀𝑡       (Equation 1) 
Where GDP is the gross domestic products expressed in nominal prices in US$, 𝛽Debts 
represent various debt components and 𝛾𝑋 represents the control variables.  
The variables are converted into logarithms to aid with the analysis of the estimated 
coefficients because it makes non-linear parameters in a model linear (Asteriou & Hall, 2007).  
Transferred to natural logs, the regression equations are: 
In(GDPt) =β0 +β1In(Debtst) +β2In(INFLt) +β3In(FDIt) + εt   (Equation 2) 
 
Where Debts represent general debt (GDEBT), INFL represents inflation and FDI represents 
foreign direct investment and εt is the error term.  
The relationship of various debt components to GDP will be assessed according to two 
categories of government debt, and the deduced models will be as follows: 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)t = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1ln(FXD) t + 𝛿2ln(INFL) t + 𝛿3ln(FDI) t + 𝜑t    (Equation 3) 
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ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)t = 𝜂0 + 𝜂1ln(LOCALD) t + 𝜂2ln(INFL) t + 𝜂3ln(FDI) t + 𝜏t   (Equation 4) 
 
Where FXD and LOCALD represent foreign debt and local debt respectively. 
 
3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics produced provided information on the mean, median, minimum, 
maximum as well as standard deviation and skewness of the data. This provided information 
that helps the study determine whether the GDP and general state debt variables are the 
symmetric or not. Descriptive statistics also highlight features of the residual of the GDP and 
independent variables.  
3.7 Unit Root Testing 
Granger and Newbold (1974) articulate that when non-stationary data is encapsulated in data 
examination, it is probably going to yield spurious results. They enunciate that the sequences 
in the data will lead to fictitious ties that imply a correlation between the data when in pragmatic 
use and when no correlation exists. The data is thus gauged for stationarity, using a unit root 
test.  To assess whether the variables are stationary and the order of integration, the test for 
a unit root was done using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to test for stationary on 
economic growth and general debt, local debt and foreign debt.  For each trend under this 
study, the ADF regression of the ensuing discourse is approximated. Critical values from the 
Dickey and Fuller (1976) tables are engaged in evaluating the statistical significance of 
estimated parameters  (Dickey & Fuller, 1976).  
3.8 ARDL Cointegration Testing Approach 
Cointegration is an econometric conceptualization which simulates the prevalence of a long-
run equilibrium among economic time series. If two or more series are nonstationary, but a 
linear combination of them is stationary, then they are said to be cointegrated (Wagner & 
Lakiwa, 2014). Cointegration analysis is the statistical consequence of the long-run 
relationship between economic variables. The embryonic philosophy behind cointegration is 
that, if in the future two or more series move diligently in collaboration even though the series 
was trended, the variance between them is constant. Deficiency of cointegration recommends 
that such variables have no future correlation, in principle they can roam randomly far away 
from each other. Dickey and Fuller (1981) says that a linear combination of non-stationary 
variables is articulated to be cointegrated if the blunder term is obtained from the co-integrated.  
The cointegration test was conducted to establish a long-run relationship between the GDP, 
general debt, foreign debt and local debt variables.  
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Although various cointegration tests exist such as the Engle and Granger (1987) and Watson 
and Johansen (1988), the method deployed for testing cointegration in this research was Auto 
Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL).  The estimated criterion employing the ARDL is mooted 
by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). This school of thought has 
a plethora of merits when juxtaposed to standard multivariate cointegration such as Johansen 
and Juselius (Goyal, 2017). One merit is that the bound test criterion is simple and easy to 
follow. This approach also eradicates the pretesting challenge associated with the standard 
cointegration test. 
Another merit for using ARDL approach is that it is suited for small sample sizes and furnishes 
an option for evaluating long-run correlations taking into cognisance whether the nitty-gritty 
variables have a unit root (Riba, 2016). The specified ARDL equation is: 
D(L(GDPt)) = β0 +  𝛽1L(GDPt-1)+ β2L(GDPt-2) + β3L(DGPt-3) + β4L(GDPt-4) + β5L(GDEBT) + 
β6L(FXD) + β7 L(LOCALD) + β8 L(INFL) + β9L(FDI)  + Σ αiDL(GDPt-i)) +  Σα5L(GDEBTt-i ) + 
Σα6L(FXDt-i) + Σα7L(LOCALDt-i) + Σα8L(INFLt-i) + Σα10L(FDIt-i)) + εlt                                                                                                        
                                                                                                            (Equation 6) 
3.9 Long and Short Run Tests 
In a study by Swang (2016), the application of the ARDL approach to cointegration 
encapsulated probability of the following unrestricted error correction model (UECM). The 
ARDL frame of reference permits for the recognition of short-run dynamics and long-run 
relationship as per the discourse cited by Gomez -Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2015) on the 
ARDL cointegration technique. They demonstrated that this is achieved through integrating 
short-run dynamics with long-run equanimity, thus resulting in an analysis of long-run relations 
between integrated constructs and reparameterizing the correlation between the variables into 
an error correction model (ECM) (Gomez-Puig & Sosviella-Rivero, 2015). The reparametrized 
result then furnishes the short-run dynamics and the long run correlation of the variables 
concerned. 
The expanded equation for long-run regression cointegration ARDL for a linear relationship is 
given as:  
𝐿(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡) =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖𝐿(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑝0
𝑖=0
∑ 𝛼2𝑖𝐿(𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞1
𝑖=0 ∑ 𝛼3𝑖𝐿(𝐹𝑋𝐷𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞2
𝑖=0 ∑ 𝛼4𝑖𝐿(𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐷𝑡−𝑖) +  ∑ 𝛼5𝑖𝐿(𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞4
𝑖=0
𝑞3
𝑖=0
 ∑ 𝛼6𝑖𝐿(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞5
𝑖=0 𝜀𝑡                
 (Equation 7) 
 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) furnish a set of essential values postulating first that the 
variables under are I (1) and, secondly, that such variables are I (0). This academia postulates 
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a bound testing strategy: if the computed F or t-statistics is superior the upper critical bound, 
the discourse is in favor of a long-run relationship regardless of the order of integration. 
However, if these figures are below the lower critical bound, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration cannot be excluded. Ultimately, if the computed F and t-statistics are in the range 
of upper critical bound and lower critical bound, then the decision about cointegration is feeble. 
When the order of integration for all series is I (1) then the decision is based on the upper 
critical bound; and if all the series are I (0), it is based on the lower critical bound (Sibanda, 
2018). 
The test statistics calculated on the equation have a diverse distribution under the null 
hypothesis of no level correlation, incumbent upon the regressions is all I (0) or all I (1). 
Further, under both circumstances the distribution is non-standard. Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(2001) furnish critical values for the cases where all regressors are I (0) and the cases where 
all regressors are I (1) and enunciates that these critical values be positioned as bounds for 
the more typical cases where the regressions are a mixture of I (0) and I (1). 
3.10 Short Run Error Correction Model  
To obtain the error correction estimates, this research adopts a study by (Swamy, 2014), that 
specifies the error correction models as: 𝐷𝐿(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡) =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖𝐷(𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑃
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛼2𝑖𝐷(𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛼3𝑖𝐷(𝐿𝐹𝑋𝐷𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛼4𝑖𝐷(𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐷𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛼5𝑖𝐷(𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞
𝑖=1  
∑ 𝛼6𝑖𝐷(𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡−𝑖) +
𝑞
𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡  
(Equation 8) 
Where ECTt-1 is the error correction term. 
As a rule of thumb for pragmatics of a short run relationship, the error correction coefficient 
(cointEq) should be negative and significant as shown by the t-statistic and its p-value. 
According to Gomez -Puig and Sosvilla- Rivero (2015) the cointEq is referred to as the speed 
of adjustment parameter, as it demonstrates how much of the imbalance in the previous period 
is corrected in the current period. Thus, the cointEq coefficient is anticipated to lie between 0 
and -1, with values closer to -1 being reckoned more significant. Where the cointEq is equal 
to or beyond -1, it may be indicative of instantaneous changes whereas, at 0.5, the changes 
would be taking place in each period. The coefficients of the first-differenced variables indicate 
the short run impact. 
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3.11 Causality Test  
The study employs the Granger Causality Test to address the question of provisional causality 
between government debt variables and economic growth. The null hypotheses in this test is 
that: 
H0: General debt does not cause GDP 
H1: General debt causes GDP 
3.12 Limitations 
The study nevertheless noted a limitation posed by variables using different conventions such 
as inflation and foreign direct investment which are percentage rates while the rest of the 
variables are monetary values. This was overcome by converting all variables into natural logs 
to allow for ease of interpretation of data.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents analysis, findings, and discussions of secondary data as per the method 
highlighted in the prior chapter. This chapter proceeds with arguments on the descriptive 
statistics and discussions on results from regression, ADF, ARDL and Granger Causality tests.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents results from the descriptive statistics on the variables in the study. GDP 
recorded the highest mean, median, minimum and maximum which shows that GDP values 
are more substantial than all other variables. The mean for every variable is similar to their 
respective median values, which is indicative of symmetric characteristics in the data. 
Regarding variability measured by standard deviation, GDP indicates the highest variability at 
4557.18 standard deviations, meaning that the GDP dataset is further from the mean and that 
quarterly GDP figures have changed significantly during the sample period. Foreign direct 
investment indicates the lowest variance of 0.43, followed by inflation with the standard 
deviation of 2.79.  
In terms of the degree of direction and asymmetry, measured by skewness, the rule of thumb 
is: a symmetric distribution (normal distribution) has a skewness statistic of 0; if 
the skewness is between -0.5 and 0.5, the data is symmetrical; if it is between -1 and – 0.5 or 
between 0.5 and 1, the data is moderately skewed; and if skewness is less than -1 or greater 
than 1, the data is highly skewed. Local debt, foreign direct investment and GDP display 
normal distribution skewness of 0.23, 0.27 and 0.47 respectively. General debt shows a 
moderate positive skewness with a coefficient of 0.59, and foreign debt shows high positive 
skewness with a coefficient of 1.21.  
In terms of the tails’ extremity measured by kurtosis, the rule of thumb is that: a normal 
distribution has a kurtosis of 3; if the kurtosis is greater than 3, the dataset has heavier tails 
than a normal distribution; if the kurtosis is less than 3, the data has lighter tails than a normal 
distribution. All variables except foreign debt, have kurtosis coefficients of less than 3, 
indicating moderate lighter tails than a normal distribution. Foreign debt kurtosis coefficient of 
3.58 suggest that the data has heavier tails than the normal distribution.   
The Jarque–Bera statistic signals the goodness-of-fit on whether the residuals of the sample 
data’s skewness and kurtosis meet the features of a normal distribution. Generally, a large 
Jarque-Bera value indicates that errors are not normally distributed. The hypotheses of 
Jarque-Bera Test for Normality are formulated as:  
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H0: Data error term is normally distributed 
Ha: Data error term is not normally distributed  
Data that is normally distributed displays symmetrical features i.e. skewness of 0, a kurtosis 
of 3 or excess kurtosis of 0 and a Jarque-Bera statistic of 0. In the present study, resulting 
Jarque-Bera values of 3.66 for GDP, 4.56 for general debt, 17.66 for foreign debt, 1.55 for 
local debt, 3.63 for inflation and 4.38 for foreign direct investment means that the null 
hypothesis has been rejected at 5% level of significance.  In other words, the data does not 
emanate from a normal distribution.  
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP GDEBT FXD LOCALD INFL FDI 
Mean 19672.66 2140.093 624.8237 1515.269 6.735294 1.477073 
Median 19125.48 1877.127 404.7731 1535.027 5.85 1.388421 
Maximum 28189.76 4766.222 2181.04 2974.497 13.1 2.18509 
Minimum 12368.09 676.4836 117.0764 541.7998 2.1 0.791005 
Std.Dev. 4557.18 1063.928 519.832 589.0327 2.791659 0.432336 
Skewness 0.274706 0.589879 1.2144079 0.084829 0.472599 0.231158 
Kurtosis 2.0004684 2.533612 3.580512 2.280338 2.377879 1.846475 
Jarque-Bera 3.662109 4.559819 17.66001 1.548976 3.627899 4.375673 
Probability 0.160245 0.102293 0.000146 0.460949 0.163009 0.112159 
Sum 1337741 145526.3 42488.01 103038.3 458 100.441 
Sum Sq.Dev. 1.39E+09 75840133 18105093 23246289 522.1553 12.52328 
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Notes: Hypothesis for normality = Ho: Data is normally distributed at skewness of 0, kurtosis of 3 and Jarque-
Bera of 0.  Source: Author (2019) 
4.3 Correlation and Multicollinearity 
A correlation matrix for all variables is presented as per Table 4.2. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient studies the strength and trend of the linear relationship between two constant 
variables. The correlation coefficient can range in value from −1 to +1. The larger the absolute 
value of the coefficient, the stronger the relationship between the variables. A positive value 
is indicative of a positive relationship, and a negative value implies an inverse relationship 
between the variables.   
For purposes of this discourse, the strength of correlation will be determined as: the correlation 
absolute value obtained of 0.7 or higher,  is  used to indicate the independence of the variable 
and thus befitting for incorporation in the model; if the absolute value falls between 0.4 and 
0.7, it is moderate correlation; and if the absolute value is less than 0.4, it will be considered 
as low correlation. From the results, the assessment of relation between GDP and each 
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independent variable was conducted, and foreign debt displays the highest correlation to GDP, 
followed by general debt and local debt respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix  
  LGDP LGDEBT LFXD LLOCALD LINFL LFDI 
LGDP 1 0.910661 0.96109 0.844211 -0.3833 0.274017 
LGDEBT 0.910661 1 0.960665 0.982358 -0.5958 0.177759 
LFXD 0.96109 0.960665 1 0.894853 -0.4235 0.246318 
LLOCALD 0.844211 0.982358 0.894853 1 -0.67221 0.150533 
LINFL -0.3833 -0.5958 -0.4235 -0.67221 1 -0.097933 
LFDI 0.274017 0.177759 0.246318 0.150533 -0.097933 1 
Notes: L=Natural logarithm; GDP= GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GDEBT= GENERAL STATEDEBT; 
FXD=FOREIGN DEBT; LOCALD= LOCAL DEBT; INFL=INFLATION; FDI=FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT; 
Source: Author (2019) 
 
Foreign direct investment shows a low positive correlation to GDP, and inflation is negatively 
associated with GDP, indicating a linear low inverse relationship to GDP.  From the coefficients 
regarding an association to GDP, it can be deduced that all variables, except inflation and FDI, 
have a strong association and therefore linearly correlated to GDP, thus meeting the normality 
assumption associated with the linear regression. 
 
Multicollinearity is the inter-relation amongst the independent variables used to weigh the 
significance of each independent variable in the model. If there is a high association between 
the independent variables, this is a signal that one of these variables could be redundant within 
the model and thus plausibly requiring to be dropped from the model.  
 
The correlation matrix indicates a strong correlation between general debt, foreign debt and 
local debt. This is because local debt and foreign debt summed up constitute general debt. 
Within the setting of model 2 (general debt), it is evident that the correlation levels between 
general debt and foreign direct investment and inflation are significantly low as per the 
thresholds set prior, thus having low multicollinearity. The high correlation between general 
debt, foreign debt and local debt were dealt with by developing two separate models to 
examine the relation between foreign debt as well as local debt and economic growth in model 
3 (foreign debt) and model 4 (local debt). 
 
The correlation levels between variables in models 3 (foreign debt) and 4 (local debt) are low 
to medium (being less than 0.7) concerning inflation and foreign direct investment. A 
conclusion can be drawn that the t-statistics and related p-values of each variable can be 
considered to test the significance of the independent variables in the regression model and 
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that all the independent variables designated for this discourse are significant per models’ 
specifications. 
4.4 Unit Root Testing for Stationarity 
It is critical to understand the order of integration of the variables in the research before 
undertaking additional econometric tests. Another reason why this is important is that it helps 
the study decide on the proper tests to conduct, provided the order of integration of the 
variables in the study. When the presence of a unit root is established for variables, the trigger 
is to check whether there is a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables. The 
existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship amongst variables is called cointegration. 
 
The following course of action is to test variables for stationarity of the variables, using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. Table 4. 3  presents the results of the ADF results. All 
variables contain unit root at level I(0) 5% level of significance. At first difference, none of the 
variables has unit root at 5% significance level. The variables were lagged at the automatic 
selection, but to maintain a uniform, a maximum of lag of 4 was chosen to accommodate the 
fact that the data is quarterly. The rest of the parameters were automatically selected in 
EViews with the intercept included in the equation.  
 
The study failed to reject the null hypothesis that states that the variables have unit root at 
level I(0), and rejected the null hypothis at level 1(1). This finding is consistent with a study 
conducted by Muyaba (2016) on the relationship between public spending and economic 
growth in Zambia. Muyaba (2016), however, found both GDP and public expenditure to be 
stationary at I(1) using the intercept in the test equation. 
 
Table 4.3 ADF Results  
 t-stat I(0) t-stat I(1) p(0) p(1) I(0) 𝑯𝟎 I(1) 𝑯𝟎 
LGDP -0.29308 -13.2097 0.9195 0.00000 -2.90766 FTR -2.90766 Reject 
LGDebt -0.80951 -6.67073 0.8097 0.00000 -2.90621 FTR -2.90621 Reject 
LFXD -0.67314 -8.56734 0.8459 0.00000 -2.90552 FTR -2.90621 Reject 
LLOCALD -1.13407 -5.80553 0.6975 0.00000 -2.90621 FTR -2.90621 Reject 
LINFL -2.89251 -3.56281 0.0516 0.00920 -2.90621 FTR -2.90621 Reject 
LFDI -1.44156 -6.79373 0.5564 0.00000 -2.90842 FTR -2.90842 Reject 
Note: L=Natural logarithm; GDP= GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT; GDEBT= GENERAL STATEDEBT; FXD=FOREIGN DEBT; 
LOCALD= LOCAL DEBT; INFL=INFLATION; FDI=FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT; FTR=Failed to reject the Null Hypothesis; 
Source: Author (2019)   
 
4.5 ARDL Cointegration Framework 
The null hypothesis in ARDL bounds calculation tests states that no long-run relationship 
exists between the variables. Critical values at each level were tested for the hypothesis using 
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the F-statistic. The value of the F-statistic obtained was 8.264 for model 2, 8.525 for model 3, 
and 8.013 for model 4. Pesaran et al., (2001) expound on the critical values of the F-statistic 
for numerous variables. Two sets of critical values, one assuming that all the variables in the 
ARDL model are integrated at the level I (0), range from 2.37 at 10%, 2.79 at 5% to 3.65 at 
1%, marking the lower critical bound, which means that there is no cointegration amongst the 
variables. If all the variables are integrated at first order I (1), as observed in Table 4.4. The 
critical values range from 3.20 at 10%, 3.67 at 5% and 4.66 at 1%, noting the upper critical 
bound, meaning that there is cointegration among the variables. Selecting a level 5% to test 
the hypothesis, the study detected that the F-statistics for model 2 of 8.264, 8.525 for model 
3 and 8.013 for model 4 were more significant than both the lower critical bounds of 2.79 and 
the upper critical bounds of 3.67. This suggests the existence of a cointegration relationship. 
The study thus rejects the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the independent 
variables and GDP.  
Table 4.4 Bound Tests  
    Critical Value1% Critical Value5% Critical Value10% 
  F-statistic I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) 
   3.65 4.66 2.79 3.67 2.37 3.2 
Model 2 8.264088 Reject Reject Reject 
Model 3 8.524769 Reject Reject Reject 
Model 4 8.012982 Reject Reject Reject 
Source: Author (2019) 
 
4.5.1 ARDL Long Run Regression Results  
After establishing the presence of a long run relationship between the three types of debt and 
GDP, the ARDL co-integration approach can now be applied to estimate the individual long-
run relationship between the variables. Table 4.5 presents the long-run estimates. Debt shows 
a positive relationship with GDP and is significant at 1% under models 2 (general debt) and 3 
(foreign debt). Model 4 (local debt) shows a positive relationship to GDP that is significant at 
5%. The positive relationship found between the Namibian government debt and GDP could 
imply that the government is using debt to finance productive capital projects, thus stimulating 
the economy to increase production output. The results could also suggest that Namibia’s debt 
is still manageable as it falls within the sustainable debt-to-GDP threshold level for African 
countries of 80% as computed by Muhanji and Ojah (2011). These findings concur with those 
by AKRAM (2017) who found that public external debt helps the process of economic growth 
and that domestic debt has positive and significant relationship with GDP in Sri Lanka. The 
findings also resonate with those by Umaru et al., who found a positive relationship between 
local debt and economic growth in Nigeria. The findings contradict those by Swamy (2014), 
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as they found a negative relationship between state debt and growth in the long run, of which 
the point approximations of the range of econometric specifications suggest that a 10-
percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with 2 to 23 basis point 
reduction in average economic growth. Their study also established a nonlinear relationship 
between debt and growth. The positive long-run relationship between government debt and 
economic growth observed in this study also differs from a study by Shabbir (2013) that found 
that an increase in external debt stock reduces the fiscal space to service external debt 
liabilities and thus dampens the economic growth.  
Table 4.5 Long Run Estimates  
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant     2.962439* 
(6.104795) 
3.706344* 
(20.71486) 
2.804185* 
(2.881668) 
LGDebt 0.437802* 
(3.733706)   
LFXD 
 
0.263462* 
(6.036176)  
LLOCALD 
  
0.541750** 
(2.153067) 
Inflation 0.012377 
(0.078228) 
-0.057808 
(-0.645996) 
-0.012698 
(-0.044311) 
LFDI 0.079335 
(0.497583) 
0.029203 
(0.284361) 
0.095143 
(0.362982) 
 
Note: L=Natural logarithm; GDP= GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT; GDEBT= GENERAL STATEDEBT; FXD=FOREIGN DEBT; 
LOCALD= LOCAL DEBT; INFL=INFLATION; FDI=FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT; *, ** and *** denotes significance at 1%; 5% 
and 10% respectively: Source: Author (2019) 
 
4.5.2 Short Run Estimates and Error Correction 
Since the long run relationship was determined, the next step is to estimate the short-run 
dynamics within the framework of the ARDL model. Table 4.6 presents the results of the short 
run error correction terms. In the short run, debt has a positive relationship with GDP at 1% 
level of significance for model 3(foreign debt). Debt shows a negative but insignificant 
relationship for model 4(local debt). Inflation shows a positive relationship for models 2(general 
debt) and 4 at 1% level of significance.  These findings are contrary with results from a study 
by Antonakakis (2013) that non-sustainable debt-ratios above and below the 60% threshold, 
have a detrimental effect on short-run economic growth, while sustainable debt-ratios below 
the 90% threshold exert a positive influence on short-run economic growth.  
The significance of the negative coefficient of the error correction term (cointEq) across all the 
models confirms the convergence to long-run equilibrium from the short-run. The cointEq 
coefficient indicates the rate at which the long-run disequilibrium is corrected at a rate of about 
11% for model 2, 17% for model 3 and 6% for model 4. The diagnostic statistics indicate a 
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decent predictability power across the three models, based on high R-squared and adjusted 
R-squared values, within the range of 60% to 63%, and Durbin-Watson values within the 
acceptable range as they are close to 2 which is considered relatively fit. Moreover, the 
estimated error correction coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level of significance to 
ensure the correction of the slight errors at the average speed of 12% across all models. 
Table 4.6 Short Run Error Correction Terms     
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
DLGDP -0.738512* 
(-8.278953) 
-0.697722* 
(-7.999628) 
-0.769349* 
(-8.438628) 
DLDebt  0.183966 
(0.449458)     
DLFXD 
 
 0.088726* 
(3.022642)  
DLLOCALD 
  
-0.112510 
(-1.313716) 
DLInflation  0.231912* 
(3.293675) 
 0.077831 
(1.169459) 
 0.201099* 
(3.928764) 
DLFDI  0.032754 
(0.887689) 
 0.017472 
(0.659565) 
 -0.000301 
( -0.0009781) 
CointEq(-1) -0.106374* 
(-6.653713) 
-0.166665* 
(-6.757840) 
-0.064888* 
(-6.551846) 
F-Stat 8.264088 8.524769 8.012982 
R-Squared 0.626003 0.630946 0.621115 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.607303 0.612493 0.602171 
Dublin Watson 1.84197 1.840432 1.852220 
Note: L=Natural logarithm; GDP= GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT; GDEBT= GENERAL STATEDEBT; 
FXD=FOREIGN DEBT; LOCALD= LOCAL DEBT; INFL=INFLATION; FDI=FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT *, ** 
and *** denotes significance at 1%; 5% and 10% respectively: Source: Author (2019) 
 
The ARDL model was further tested for stability. The CUSUM (Brown, Durbin, and Evans, 
1975) test of recursive residuals was performed to check the stability of the coefficients of the 
ARDL model over the sample period. This route plots the cumulative sum together with the 
5% critical lines. The test finds parameter instability if the cumulative sum goes outside the 
area between the two critical lines. Results of the (CUSUM) and the CUSUM of the square 
(CUSUMSQ) found in Figures 1 - 6 in Appendix indicate the absence of any instability of the 
coefficients. 
Other diagnostic tests were conducted for serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and normality. 
The results in Table 4.7 reveal that the model is stable, there is no serial correlation up to lag 
order 4, no heteroscedasticity and the errors are normally distributed. 
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Table 4.7 Diagnostics test results for ARDL model 
Test Null Hypothesis T-Statistics P-value Deduction 
  Model 2 
Autocorrelation LM Test 
There is no serial 
correlation 
At lag 4, LM stat 
= 2.664 
0.0425 
No serial 
correlation  
Jarque Bera 
Residuals are normally 
distributed 
Jacque Bera = 
1.8973 
0.387 
Normally 
distributed 
White without cross 
terms 
There is no 
heteroskedasticity 
1.310278 0.9837 
No 
heteroskedasticity 
  Model 3 
Autocorrelation LM Test 
There is no serial 
correlation 
At lag 4, LM stat 
= 2.1037 
0.0936 
No serial 
correlation  
Jarque Bera 
Residuals are normally 
distributed 
1.8009 0.406 
Normally 
distributed 
White without cross 
terms 
There is no 
heteroskedasticity 
1.255849 0.9852 
No 
heteroskedasticity 
  Model 4 
Autocorrelation LM Test 
There is no serial 
correlation 
At lag 4, LM stat 
= 2.496 
0.0539 
No serial 
correlation  
Jarque Bera 
Model is normally 
distributed 
1.7556 0.4156 
Residuals are 
normally 
distributed 
White without cross 
terms 
There is no 
heteroskedasticity 
1.340811 0.982 
No 
heteroskedasticity 
     
Source: Author (2019) 
 
4.6 Granger Causality 
The Pairwise Granger causality analysis was conducted to determine the direction of causality 
relationship amongst the variables for the period 2000Q1-2016Q4. Pairwise Granger 
Causality Tests were conducted at different lags ranging from 2 – 4. The causality test results 
are presented in Table 4.8, and the study fails to reject the hypothesis when the probability 
value is greater than 5 % because this is the desired significance. If the probability value is 
smaller than 5%, the study rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternative for Granger 
causality. 
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Table 4.8 Summary of Pairwise Granger Causality Results  
Null Hypothesis N Lags F-test P-values Conclusion Decision 
LGDEBT does not Granger Cause LGDP 
66 
  1.81065 0.1722 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGDEBT 2 1.22388 0.3012 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LFXD does not Granger Cause LGDP 
66 
 3.10412 0.052 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LFXD 2 3.10106 0.1526 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LLOCALD does not Granger Cause LGDP 
66 
 1.24276 0.2958 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LLOCALD 2 1.1808 0.314 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LINFL does not Granger Cause LGDP 
66 
 0.14203 0.8679 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LINFL 2 0.38901 0.6794 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LFDI does not Granger Cause LGDP 
66 
 0.33408 0.7173 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LFDI 2 0.07109 0.9315 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDEBT does not Granger Cause LGDP 
65 3 
0.7299 0.5383 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGDEBT 0.83909 0.478 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LFXD does not Granger Cause LGDP 
65 3 
1.03481 0.384 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LFXD 1.97035 0.1284 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LLOCALD does not Granger Cause LGDP 
65 3 
0.51672 0.6724 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LOCALD 0.9963 0.4011 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LINFL does not Granger Cause LGDP 
65 3 
0.12746 0.9434 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LINFL 1.06122 0.3726 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LFDI does not Granger Cause LGDP 
65 3 
0.37515 0.7712 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LFDI 0.06958 0.9759 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDEBT does not Granger Cause LGDP 
64 4 
1.25998 0.2968 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGDEBT 1.18698 0.3268 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LFXD does not Granger Cause LGDP 
64 4 
0.93305 0.4517 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LFXD 1.72826 0.1569 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LLOCALD does not Granger Cause LGDP 
64 4 
1.27456 0.2911 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LOCALD 1.06202 0.3841 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LINFL does not Granger Cause LGDP 
64 4 
0.49648 0.7383 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LINFL 0.74544 0.5652 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LFDI does not Granger Cause LGDP 
64 4 
0.7533 0.5601 No Causality Fail to Reject 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LFDI 0.25014 0.9345 No Causality Fail to Reject 
Source: Author (2019) 
The study found no causality effect between GDP and the independent variables (general 
debt, foreign debt and local debt). The study fails to reject the null hypothesis which states 
that government debt does not cause GDP. This finding resonates with a study by 
Ogunmuyiwa (2011) which concluded that causality does not exist between external debt and 
economic growth. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a summary of the findings, conclusion and policy recommendations 
based on the study results.   
5.2 Summary of Research  
The purpose of this study was to examine whether there is a relationship between sovereign 
debt (general government debt) and economic growth for Namibia over the period 2000 - 
2016. The study further assessed if there is a relationship between the two components that 
make up general government debt namely, external debt (foreign debt) and local debt and 
economic growth. The study sought to assess the short run and long run relationship and test 
the causality effect between the variables. 
To achieve these objectives, the research used secondary data from the Namibia Statistics 
Agency, Bank of Namibia and IMF, and undertook the following steps to conduct tests in E-
Views:  
• First, the linear regression equation was estimated to determine the relationship 
between general government debt, foreign debt and domestic debt and economic 
growth in Namibia as well as the significance of the variables. 
• Second, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test was conducted for unit root test and to 
establish the order of integration between the variables to aid in choosing the fitness 
of the subsequent tests. 
• Third, the ARDL bounds framework was used to determine the co-integration and to 
check if a long run and short run relationship exists between general state debt, 
domestic and external debt and economic growth. 
• Finally, a Pairwise Granger Causality test was conducted to establish the causality 
effect between the variables. 
In summary, the linearity test established a positive relationship between general government 
debt and economic growth and a positive relationship between foreign debt and domestic debt 
and economic growth. 
About stationarity, all variables were found to be non-stationary and to have a unit root at level 
I (0) and 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. At first difference, all variables were stationary, 
and none of the variables was found to contain unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels. 
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The results from the ARDL framework tests, the study established that a positive and 
significant long run and short run relationship exists between government debt components 
and GDP. The study rejected the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship. The cointEq 
coefficients indicate the rate at which the long-run disequilibrium is corrected to be an average 
rate of 12%.  
Results from the Pairwise Granger Causality test found no causality between GDP and 
general government debt, foreign debt and local debt. The study failed to reject the null 
hypothesis which states that general government debt does not cause GDP. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This study analysed the effect of government debt (general debt, foreign debt and local debt) 
on economic growth for Namibia over the sample period, 2000 – 2016. The study does not 
assert that the results are perfect but affirms that they were established on generally accepted 
econometric standards, based on sound economic logic. The study contributes to a plethora 
of literature on the relationship between debt and economic growth, and it enriches literature 
with findings for a developing economy in the African context.  
 
The study observed a positive relationship between general government debt and economic 
growth and that long run and short run relationships exist between the variables. The study, 
therefore, failed to reject the central hypothesis of this research which 𝐻𝑜 states that there is 
a positive relationship between the government debt and economic growth in Namibia over 
the sample period.  
 
The inference of these results for the Namibian government and lawmakers is that, since 
borrowing secures much-needed funds to aid development, a hefty debt load can also 
discourage economic growth and development via numerous means such as crowding out of 
private investment and public investment spending because of high-interest rate and debt 
servicing. Lawmakers need to strike a balance between excess debt levels that could threaten 
development and sufficient debt levels that are plausible to stimulate economic growth. 
5.4 Recommendations 
From a policy perceptive, the findings of this study could help in formulating debt-oriented 
policies. Notably, the presence of a positive impact of debt on GDP in Namibia should be 
deliberated on as the state could consider borrowing more to support infrastructure 
development needed for economic growth.  
General debate has been that, where debt is significant, macroeconomic policies are less 
efficient and unstable, and can end up in low economic growth over a long period (Presbitero, 
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2008). The state of Namibia urgently needs to ensure that external debt funds are used only 
for developmental projects that could result in clear economic benefits because repayment 
and servicing of external debt depletes foreign reserves much needed to pay for import of 
essential goods and services that the country currently has no capacity to produce.  
Finally, the study, recommends a more active use of the general government debt Fund to 
stimulate positive economic growth. 
 
5.5 Areas of Further Research Studies  
This research only assessed the relationship between government debt and economic growth. 
Further research needed to expand on this study is to examine the relationship between the 
Namibian government debt and other determinants of economic growth such as consumption 
and investment. This will add value for policymakers as it could unravel valuable evidence that 
can be used in determining the optimal mix of government debt and other determinants to 
warrant that the economy is performing at its optimal level.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1.1 Secondary Data 
Quarters GDP  GDebt  FXD LocalD Inflation  FDI  
2000Q1 13695.7 842.314 119.403 722.911 10.7 1.4 
2000Q2 13361.8 786.28 117.076 669.203 10.3 1.4 
2000Q3 12368.1 849.708 135.174 714.535 10 1.4 
2000Q4 13907.1 750.849 127.763 623.086 9.8 1.4 
2001Q1 13645.3 764.857 125.044 639.812 9.8 1.2 
2001Q2 13985.3 777.782 149.786 627.996 10 1.2 
2001Q3 12540.3 848.496 192.555 655.94 10.3 1.2 
2001Q4 14214.7 737.387 153.278 584.109 10.7 1.2 
2002Q1 14406.5 676.484 134.684 541.8 13 1.1 
2002Q2 14568.3 770.549 151.874 618.675 13.1 1.1 
2002Q3 12925 767.762 141.682 626.08 12.8 1.1 
2002Q4 14837.8 821.499 125.675 695.824 11.9 1.1 
2003Q1 15290.5 1035.96 177.631 858.327 8.9 1 
2003Q2 15589.3 1241.57 183.459 1058.11 7.7 1 
2003Q3 13760.1 1343.84 215.846 1127.99 6.6 1 
2003Q4 15597.5 1515.46 238.48 1276.98 5.7 1 
2004Q1 16591.7 1612.07 263.511 1348.56 5.1 0.9 
2004Q2 16540.1 1822.56 281.247 1541.32 4.4 0.9 
2004Q3 15823.3 1974.15 300.648 1673.5 3.8 0.9 
2004Q4 16802.7 2072.93 332.753 1740.18 3.2 0.9 
2005Q1 16926.4 2083.07 343.498 1739.57 2.3 1.4 
2005Q2 16910.8 1936.42 304.255 1632.17 2.1 1.4 
2005Q3 15225.7 1973.38 307.313 1666.07 2.2 1.4 
2005Q4 17717.9 1935.62 298.778 1636.85 2.6 1.4 
2006Q1 17715.4 2170.59 405.479 1765.12 4.2 1.3 
2006Q2 18221.4 2130.34 414.889 1715.45 4.8 1.3 
2006Q3 16828 1890.15 353.34 1536.81 5.3 1.3 
2006Q4 18846.1 1864.11 370.444 1493.66 5.7 1.3 
2007Q1 18059.1 1858.65 382.791 1475.86 5.8 2.1 
2007Q2 18372 1650.83 379.446 1271.39 6.2 2.1 
2007Q3 18941.1 1638.93 404.037 1234.89 6.7 2.1 
2007Q4 20287.9 1762.22 464.457 1297.77 7.3 2.1 
2008Q1 19878 1650.43 433.215 1217.22 8.5 2.2 
2008Q2 18822.4 1628.16 440.206 1187.96 9 2.2 
2008Q3 19654.7 1693.76 474.233 1219.53 9.4 2.2 
2008Q4 19309.8 1361.58 376.706 984.874 9.6 2.2 
2009Q1 18667.4 1327.32 333.219 994.101 10.1 1.4 
2009Q2 17990.2 1545.46 359.629 1185.83 9.9 1.4 
2009Q3 19825 1729.45 425.601 1303.85 9.4 1.4 
2009Q4 21412.3 1590.31 406.367 1183.95 8.6 1.4 
2010Q1 19895.1 1574.79 388.327 1186.46 5.9 1.8 
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2010Q2 20229.2 1629.57 404.068 1225.5 5 1.8 
2010Q3 21081.5 1769.72 407.488 1362.23 4.5 1.8 
2010Q4 21393.2 2001.95 468.698 1533.25 4.2 1.8 
2011Q1 21472.9 2252.64 456.45 1796.19 4.7 1.8 
2011Q2 20811.9 2692.2 575.057 2117.14 4.8 1.8 
2011Q3 23035.4 3359.09 1109.29 2249.8 5.1 1.8 
2011Q4 21484.3 3054.99 924.459 2130.53 5.4 1.8 
2012Q1 23894.7 3302.27 1041.79 2260.48 6.5 2.2 
2012Q2 22114.3 3191.12 991.572 2199.55 6.7 2.2 
2012Q3 22044.6 3183.61 1093.57 2090.04 6.8 2.2 
2012Q4 23144.4 3109.09 1094.05 2015.04 6.7 2.2 
2013Q1 23211.8 3103.41 1136.73 1966.67 5.9 1.6 
2013Q2 23309.6 3022.17 1102.52 1919.65 5.7 1.6 
2013Q3 25426.5 2992.42 1088.55 1903.87 5.5 1.6 
2013Q4 24370.9 3017.57 1085.85 1931.72 5.4 1.6 
2014Q1 24950.2 2884.41 1016.62 1867.79 5.7 1.2 
2014Q2 24458.9 3001.31 1079.77 1921.54 5.5 1.2 
2014Q3 26199.9 3039.97 1062.19 1977.79 5.2 1.2 
2014Q4 26827.7 3207.98 1076.01 2131.97 4.8 1.2 
2015Q1 26535.4 3304.42 1108.53 2195.88 3.3 2 
2015Q2 26184.3 3480.79 1268.87 2211.92 3.2 2 
2015Q3 27746.7 4348.6 2181.04 2167.56 3.3 2 
2015Q4 28107 4199.54 1935.37 2264.17 3.8 2 
2016Q1 27814.7 3851.51 1720.88 2130.63 4.7 0.8 
2016Q2 26068.9 4174.32 1737.02 2437.31 5.8 0.8 
2016Q3 27674.4 4577.35 1796.06 2781.29 7.3 0.8 
2016Q4 28189.8 4766.22 1791.73 2974.5 9.1 0.8 
 
Figure 1. CUSUM Model 2 (General Debt) ARDL Residuals  
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Figure 2 CUSUM of Squares Model 2 (General Debt) ARDL Residuals 
 
 
Figure 3 CUSUM Model 3(Foreign Debt) ARDL Residuals 
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Figure 4 CUSUM of Squares Model 3(Foreign Debt) ARDL Residuals 
 
 
 
Figure 5 CUSUM Model 4(Local Debt) ARDL Residuals 
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Figure 6 CUSUM of Squares Model 4(Local Debt) ARDL Residuals 
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